(I didn't say "all German soldiers were morally bankrupt"--I said I found Craig's implicit assertion that all German soldiers were good, morally pure men before Stalingrad deeply problematic. That's not the same thing.)
I also don't like to talk about morality as a basis of judgment, because it's always situational and subjective; one person's deeply moral action can be another person's worst sin, and what do you do with the evidence about Germans who believed that the genocide of the Jews was a moral imperative?
I think, however, that if an author wants to argue for this kind of moral degradation specifically at Stalingrad (or any other crisis point), he or she has to either (a.) be able to prove that any specific German soldier did not know about any of the profoundly immoral actions of the Germans--and from what I understand, it would have been hard for any German soldier not to know about the Einsatzgruppen--or (b.) be willing (and capable) of talking about the reverse-polarity morality indoctrinated by Nazi Germany. AND be willing (and capable) of talking about the real moral quandaries faced by Germans who did not agree with the Nazis, but believed that they were doing what was right for Germany. And by those Germans who didn't agree with the Nazis, and didn't think they were doing what was right for Germany, but couldn't, for whatever reason, hold onto those abstract principles (and there were plenty of reasons--I don't know that I personally would have had the courage to take a stand if I had had the great misfortune to be living in Germany in the 1930s).
My personal feeling is that, by the time they reached Stalingrad, no one in the German army could have had the kind of moral purity Craig seems to imagine--and not even because of the Nazis, but simply because of the realities of warfare. (I also don't think anyone on the Allied side had that kind of moral purity, either.)
I also never said their suffering doesn't count. Because I don't believe that at all.
no subject
(I didn't say "all German soldiers were morally bankrupt"--I said I found Craig's implicit assertion that all German soldiers were good, morally pure men before Stalingrad deeply problematic. That's not the same thing.)
I also don't like to talk about morality as a basis of judgment, because it's always situational and subjective; one person's deeply moral action can be another person's worst sin, and what do you do with the evidence about Germans who believed that the genocide of the Jews was a moral imperative?
I think, however, that if an author wants to argue for this kind of moral degradation specifically at Stalingrad (or any other crisis point), he or she has to either (a.) be able to prove that any specific German soldier did not know about any of the profoundly immoral actions of the Germans--and from what I understand, it would have been hard for any German soldier not to know about the Einsatzgruppen--or (b.) be willing (and capable) of talking about the reverse-polarity morality indoctrinated by Nazi Germany. AND be willing (and capable) of talking about the real moral quandaries faced by Germans who did not agree with the Nazis, but believed that they were doing what was right for Germany. And by those Germans who didn't agree with the Nazis, and didn't think they were doing what was right for Germany, but couldn't, for whatever reason, hold onto those abstract principles (and there were plenty of reasons--I don't know that I personally would have had the courage to take a stand if I had had the great misfortune to be living in Germany in the 1930s).
My personal feeling is that, by the time they reached Stalingrad, no one in the German army could have had the kind of moral purity Craig seems to imagine--and not even because of the Nazis, but simply because of the realities of warfare. (I also don't think anyone on the Allied side had that kind of moral purity, either.)
I also never said their suffering doesn't count. Because I don't believe that at all.